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SITUATION III 
BELLIGERENT AIRCRAFT 
The United States, states X, Y, C, and D have ratified 
the Washington treaty o:f 1922 limiting naval armament 
and the London treaty o:f 1930. States X and Y are at 
war. Other states are neutral. The British Secretary 
o:f State :for Foreign Affairs in a communication to the· 
French, Italian, and Japanese ambassadors, October 7, 
1929, stated that the Kellogg-Briand pact o:f 1928 was 
" regarded as the starting point o:f agreement," and that· 
it was hoped that the conference o:f 1930 would elaborate 
a text "vvhich will :facilitate the task o:f the League o£ · 
Nations preparation commission and o:f the subsequent 
general disarmament conference." 
(a) The commander o:f an aircraft o:f state X sumn1ons 
by radio a merchant vessel o:f a citizen o:f the United 
States, the Trader, to lie to and to wait the arrival of 
a submarine which it is also summoning by radio. The 
Trader lies to in obedience to these orders. The aircraft 
leaves be :fore the arrival o:f the submarine and the Trader 
then proceeds. 1,he submarine, later 1neeting the Trader, 
torpedoes and sinks that vessel 'vithout 'varning. 
(b) T'he commander· o:f the Hail, a cruiser o:f state X 
in a port o:f the state o:f Pana1na, desires to test an air-
craft that has been delivered to the 11 ail at another port 
and proceeds to a trial flight :from the Hail, though the 
authorities o:f the port protest. 
(1) Hovv :far in (a) and (b) above is the action o:f the 
belligerent lawful; and (2) 'vhat, i:f any, action should 
Le taken by the commanders o:f cruisers o:f the Uniterl 
States 'v hich chance to be near~ 
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(c) If the co1n1nander of the cruiser of the United 
States in the port of the state of Panama takes no action 
in regard to the conduct of the Hail, should tne authori-
tjes of the Panama Canal Zone take any action when the 
Hail enters to pass through the Canal~ 
SOLUTION 
(a) ( 1) The action of the submarine is not la w:ful, 
and (2) the cruiser of the United States should afford 
such aid as possible in rescuing the personnel of the 
Trader and report the circumstances in detail to the 
proper authority. 
(b) The action of the commander of the Hail in pro-
ceeding to a trial flight of the aircraft in a port of the 
state of Panama is not la,v:ful. The co1n1nander of the 
cruiser should report the circumstances in detail to the 
proper authority and await instructions. 
(c) The authorities of the Panama Canal Zone should 
detain the Hail, not allow·ing the vessel to enter the canal 
without instructions :from the proper authorities to whom 
the circumstances in detail should be reported. 
NOTES 
(a) Law of aerial warfare. 
Law of aerial warfare.-J\1any writers have pointed 
out that the law of the air may be more nearly analogous 
to maritime law than to land law and that this may be 
true both :for the time of peace and :for the time of war. 
Some of the writers also properly point out that while 
there may be analogies these should not be regarded as 
anything more than analogies. To regard the laws as 
identic 'vould lead to serious errors. Even the law of 
gravity must receive different recognition, and aircraft 
differ 'videly :from seacraft, whether surface or subsur-
face. '.rime and space may also be less important :factors. 
Days of grace :for private aircraft of the enemy will 
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doubtless be taken for granted. Aerial bombardment 
will not be limited to the coast. 
For warfare in and from the air certainly the rules 
should be no less strict than £or maritime warfare. 
If war is to continue, aerial warfare will be allowed. 
In this warfare aircraft will be used against other mili-
tary air, surface, and subsurface craft, fortifications, etc. 
'l'he hope that aerial warfare will be prohibited can not 
be entertained under present conditions. Aircraft have 
done n1nch to reduce the significance of time and space 
in the conduct of war, and these factor·s may often de-
termine the issue. Objection to new means of warfare 
have always been Inade, but in time of war the question 
is one of military effectivity. The means of delivery of 
an explosive shell, whether by aircraft or by gun, does 
not constitute the measure of its legality. Whether the 
projectile acts under the force of gravity in a vertical 
flight downward or makes a parabolic flight is not a 
legal question. 
Airor:aft in war.-· The development of aircraft since 
1900 has been so rapid that it is r-easonable to assume 
that it will be an increasingly important factor in war. 
It may serve as "the eyes of the fleet," "the advance 
patrol," " the antennoo," or' in other significant roles at 
sea, and on land may introduce revolutionary methods 
of warfare, while for coast warfare the aircraft may 
supplement in many ways the land and sea forces. 
Commerce may be interrupted in a manner hitherto 
impossible, and an economic wa-r may become more effec-
tive. Some have advocated measures of control by bellig-
erents which would to varying degrees restrict that 
freedom of the sea of which the United States has long 
been an advocate. 
Aerial commerce makes old rules in regard to contra-
band, blockades, etc., of doubtful applicability. 
Feasibility of use of aircraft.-It has often been said 
that owing to the fragile nature of aircraft their use for 
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visit and search was not feasible. Doubtless this is in. 
great measure true if the aircraft must be self -sufficien~ 
for the exercise of visit and search. There were, however,. 
cases reported during the vVorld War in which aircraft 
did make or aid in making captures, and much that has 
been said in regard to the nature of aircraft as instru-
ments of war has also been said in regard to submarines. 
The Gelderland, a Dutch steamer, was captured by a 
German aircraft on the high sea, July 23, 1917, and 
brought to Zeebrugge. The Hamburg prize court de-
~lared the Gelderland good prize. Other captures were 
n1ade and the transfer of prize crews from aircraft to 
captured vessels were reported. 
The problen1s of visit of a maritime craft by an air-
craft 'vould be 1nany and would depend upon the state of 
the sea and other conditions, and for visit of submarine 
craft 'vould be more difficult even if possible. Probably 
visit at the place of summons 'vould be rarely possible. 
The French delegation had proposed to the commis-
sion of jurists, 1923, that " aircraft are forbidden to op-
erate agaip.st merchant vessels, whether surface or sub-
marine, without conforming to the rules to which surface 
'varships are subject." Manifestly the visit and search 
of a submarine by an aircraft would present many diffi-
culties, and it is doubtful if the American· point of view 
of visit where encountered could be followed in cases suf-
ficient to warrant the use of aircraft for such purpose. 
To a less degree this would be true of surface vessels. 
Even if the exceptional right of diversion under the pro-
posed British article had been accepted, the nature of 
aircraft would tend to convert the exception into the rule. 
Aircraft may, however, be of great service as auxiliary 
agencies of a fleet or of a surface vessel of war in locating 
merchant vessels of the enemy or of neutrals and even in 
escorting them to a place for visit and search. If this be 
regarded simply as an extension of the normal range of 
vision or gunfire of the summoning vessel, it is reasonable 
to admit that such a case would be action of the surface 
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vessel of \Var, and vvould therefore conform to the laws 
for surface craft. 
Summons by airaraft.-Suinmons of a merchant vessel 
is the means by \vhich the attention of such a vessel is 
drawn to a vessel of vvar ,vhich desires to communicate 
with the merchant vessel. The summons may be by sig-
nal flag or by any other effective method. There is not 
any necessary implication that the use of force is con-
templated. Visit and search may or may not follow the 
summons. There seems to be no reason 'vhy the use of 
radio may not be as lawful as any other means of attract-
ing attention or \vhy an aircraft may not summon a mer-
chant vessel as well as any other craft. 
Aircraft as an mumiliary.-It has been proposed that 
aircraft be used only as auxiliary to land and naval forces 
and subject to the same rules and limitations. It may be 
pointed out that land and naval rules are not identical 
and that many of the differences are due to the inherent 
differences in land and vvater. Similarly the differences 
in the nature of air as con1pared with land or \Vater \Vill 
force recognition of different rules for its use, though 
certain broad principles may be common to the three. 
That operations of aircraft in time of war should not be 
inhuman may be admitted, but that the definition of in-
human may be the same for all can not be presumed. 
Many would press the law of self-preservation as ap-
plied to personal safety as analogous to state safety and 
hold that necessity of self-preservation of a, state knows 
no law, while it may be capable of proof in a given case 
that the nationals of the state and the world at large 
would be better off if a named state did not exist or if 
it should be absorbed by another. Such rules as apply 
to torpedoes in naval warfare manifestly can not be 
n1ade to apply without modification to aircraft projectiles. 
There are many lines in which analogy with land or mari-
time rules will not hold for war by air. 
The cutting off of co1nmunications by siege or blockade 
has been long recognized as lawful warfare on land and 
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sea. The same must be admitted for aerial warfare. 
The destruction of a maritime supply ship of an enemy 
by a vessel of 'var of an opponent would be permitted, 
and it 'vould not be unlawful for an aircraft to destroy 
such a ship. The capture and destruction of 'an enemy 
supply train or ammunition base on land would be law-
ful for land or air forces. 
The significant fact that air forces may operate in spite 
of and independently of land or naval forces must be 
evident from experience and from plans which have been 
developed. That the three may operate most effectively 
in cooperation under certain conditions is not denied. 
The life of a nation both on land and sea no longer de-
pends upon strategic fortifications along the coast and 
land frontier and na Yal patrols. Indeed an armed 
enemy convoy 1nay, " 'hile offering protection against 
1nariti1ne attack, be specially vulnerable to air attack. 
rfhat aircraft Inay be used as an agent to 'veaken the 
civilian as well as the miltary n1orale of an enemy seems 
to require no proof, but in both cases this conduct must 
be kept \Yithin the la,v. Military objectives as legal 
objects of attack by land or naval forces, may be fairly 
easily classified. Objectives of the same nature must be 
adn1itted as legitimate for aircraft; e. g., military, naval, 
and aerial bases, supply bases, ammunition manufac-
tories etc., and the location of these, 'vhether inland from 
the coast or frontier, 'vhether defended or undefended, 
\vould for aircraft be a matter of less importance than 
to other forces. 
That aircraft should be considered in legal aspects 
1nerely as auxiliary to land and naval agencies and bound 
by exactly the same rules seems an untenable proposition . 
.!lircraft attached to vessels of ~u·ar.-In 1915 the Ger-
man cruiser [{ onigsberg \Vas destroyed in a German East 
African river. Aircraft aided in locating and spotting 
the shots from the Briti~h vessels \Yhich were out of sight 
·of the J(onigsberg. The aircraft belonged to the Royal 
Naval Air Service but had been lent to the vessel of 
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'var. When the question of distribution of prize bounty 
came before the court, it 'vas decided that the pilots and 
the observers belonging to the two airplanes formed a 
part of the crews " of the vessels of war and were entitled 
to shares of the priz~ bounty. ( 3 Grant, Br·. and CoL 
Prize Cases, p. 135.) 
Aireraft on vessels of war.-There were examples of· 
the use of aircraft as aids to operations against merchant 
vessels in the World War. The lVolf, a German steamer, 
had been fitted to prey on enemy com1nerce in 1916. The 
lV olf was also to lay mines, which she did in widely sepa-
rated areas. The aircraft W olfchen was a part of the 
steamer's equipment. The W olfchen 'vas found of great 
service in scouting and observation, discovering the prox-
imity or absence of other vessels. 
On the 27th of May, 1917, when the Wolf was making 
repairs near an uninhabited island in the South Pacific,. 
the W olfchen was sent out to bring in a steamer which 
had been sighted. The W olfchen dropped orders on the· 
deck of the steamer, the W airurna of New Zealand, and 
this steamer was brought to anchor near the Wolf. 
Later the Hitachi lJf aru, with a valuable cargo, was lo-
cated by the W olfchen, and the vessel was subsequently 
taken. (Cruise of the Wolf, translated from Rivista. 
Marittima in 67 Jour. Royal United Service Institutions~. 
p. 140.) 
Washington proposals, 1.922.-The attempt to elabo-
rate rules in regard to submarines at the Washington N a-· 
val Conference, 1921-22, enunciated certain principles. 
that failed of ratification as declaratory of international 
law. These rules were presented to the conference with-
out reference to the committees to which other conventions 
were submitted and contained clauses to which ob-. 
jections were made in the meetings of the delegates them-. 
selves. Indeed, it is generally admitted that the treaty,. 
i:f it had become operative, would have been difficult to 
interpret. In any case this W asbington treaty seems to~ 
provide for deviation after seizure. 
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Dir;_;cussion in 19~3.-At The Hague Conference on 
Rules of \1Tarfare, 1923, there ·was much discussion of 
the subject of deviation and visit and search by airctaft. 
In the \V ashington treaty of 1922 in regard to submarines 
and noxious gases there had been inserted a provision to 
the efl'eet that "A merchant vessel must not be attacked 
unless it refuse to sub1nit to visit and search after warn-
ing or to proceed as directed after seizure." As Judge 
l\1oore said : 
Fron1 first to last the A.1nerican delegation consistently de-
clined to enter into the intervretation of the provisions of the 
"'"ashington treaty relating to submarines. This did not, however, 
fJJ·event the disclosure, among other things, of tLe fact that the 
treaty was intervreted lly the British delegation and perhaps by 
the Italian not only as per1nitting the deviation of a n1erchant 
vessel frOin its course for the completion of a search which a 
preliminary visit and search on the spot and seen1ed reasonably 
to justify, but also as pern1itting deviation without any prelimi-
nary visit and search or boarding whatsoever. The disclosure· 
of this interpretation, which was elicited by inquiries of the 
Netherlands delegation, immediately rendered impossible the 
adoption by the commission of the terms of Article I of the 
'Vashington treaty on submarines without some additional safe-
guard as an appropriate and adequate regulation for aircraft. 
(l\Ioore, International Law and Son1e Current Illusions, p. 204.) 
An~erican attit1tde, 1923.-The report of the committee· 
of jurists considering the revision of the rules of war-
fare and particularly radio and aircraft in 1923 gave con-
siderable attention to the use of aircraft in connection 
\vith maritime warfare. The French delegation had· 
maintained that aircraft " should conform to the rules to· 
which surface warships are subject." 
The American delegation considered that a merchant vessel 
should be boarded when she is encountered, but maintained that,. 
even if a departure from this rule might in exceptional circum-
stances be permitted in visit and search by surface ships, a similar 
concession to aircraft, with their limited means of boarding, would 
readily have the effect of converting the exception into the rule. 
Th~y stated that they were not advised of anything in the record 
of the vVashington conference showing an intention to authorize-
6957 4-31--8 
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surface ships or submarines to divert merchant vessels, without 
boarding them, to a port for examination; but that, were the case 
otherwise, the 'Vashington conference had decided that the sub-
ject of aircraft, which presented difficulties of its own and 'vhich 
might involve questions different fron1 those pertaining even to 
sub1narines, should be dealt with separately; and that to pennit 
aircraft, with their rapidity and range of flight, to control and 
direct by orders enforceable by bombing, and without visit and 
search, the 1nove1nent of 1nerchant vessels on the high seas would, 
in their opinion, give rise to an inad1nissible situation. 
The American delegation, therefo1~e, proposed the following 
text: 
"Aircraft are forbidden to visit and search surface or subsur-
face vessels without conforn1ing in all respects to the rules to 
which surface vessels authorized to conduct visit and search are 
subject. 
" In view of the irregularities to \Vhich the use of aircraft 
against 1nerchant vessels n1ight give rise, it is declared that air-
craft can not divert a merchant vessel fron1 its course without 
iirst boarding it ; that in no event may an aircraft destroy a 
1nerchant vessel unless the crew and passengers of such vessel 
have first been placed in safety; and that if an aircraft can not 
capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules it must 
c1esist fron1 attack and fr01n seizure and pern1it such vessel to 
proceed unn1olested." (1924 N. ,V. C., International Law DoC"n-
Inents, p. 138.) 
British attitude, 1c923.-The British attitude 'vas natu-
rally influenced by recent experiences in the ''T orld ''Tar 
and by some of the exceptional conditions that had then 
prevailed. This had been sho·wn in discussions at the 
Washington Conference in 1921-22, and accordingly at 
'fhe Hague in 1923. 
The British delegation n1aintained that the problem connected 
with visit and search of 1nerchant vessels by aircraft was analo-
gous to that of the exercise of such right by subn1arines, and that 
the most satisfactory solution of the problem would be to apply 
mutatis n1utandis the \vording of article 1 of the treaty signed 
at 'Vashington on February G, 1922, for the protection of the 
Jives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in tin1e of \var. 
This delegation Inaintained that by using the language of that 
treaty, as proposed, the question of the right to oblige a merchant 
vessel to deviate to a rrasonable extent would be solved because 
.the wording adovted at 'Vashington hafl been modified so as to 
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admit tllis right. The British delegates proposed the following 
text: 
"The use of aircraft against merchant vessels n1ust be regu-
lated by the following provisions, \Vhich, being in conformity with 
the rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the 
lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, are 
to be deen1ecl an established part of international law: 
" 'A merchant vessel must be ordered to sub1nit to visit and 
search to determine its character before it can be seized. 
"'A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuses to 
subn1it to visit and search after warning or to proceed as directed 
after seizure. 
" 'A merchant vessel n1ust not be destroyed unless the crew and 
passengers have first been placed in safety. 
" ' Belligerent aircraft are not uncler any circtnnstances exein!)t 
frmn the uniYersal rules aboYe stated: and if an aircraft can 
not capture a merchant Yessel in conformity with thes-e rules, 
the existing law of nations requires it to desist fro1n attack and 
fro1n seizure and to permit the n1erchant vessel to proceed unmo-
lested.'" (1924 N. "\V. C., International Law Documents, p. 139.) 
This treaty of 1922 had been the subject of considerable 
discussion, w'hich led to questions as to its 1neaning. It 
had been questioned "\Vhether the rules mentioned in the 
first paragraph had been adopted "for the protection of 
lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in tin1e of 
'Yar " or rather had been developed through a long period 
of tin1e pri1narily for the s-ecurity of property at sea. 
Question 'vas raised as to w·hether a Inerchant Yessel 
n1ight be seized i1nmediately after being ordered to sub-
Init to Yisit and search without other action on the part 
o:f the seizing vessel. Such other questions have arisen as 
do the 'vords "proceed as directed after seizure" imply 
~nnply a Yerbal order; is the placing of the cre'v and 
passengers of a merchant vessel in safety the sole bar to 
its destruction; 'vhat is a place of safety; are any of the 
rules as stated universal; does "existing law of nations " 
contain the requirements mentioned~ Some have main-
tained that the last clause is in contradiction to some of 
the earlier clauses. In any case it was not possible to 
reach an agreement on this article either· for sub1narines 
or for aircraft. 
108 BELLIGERENT AIRCRAFT 
Italian att~·tude, 192/3.-The Italian delegation at the 
vV ashington Conference had not shared the British vie"· 
in regard to the place o:£ submarines in w·ar. At The 
Hague, ho,vever, in discussing rules :for the use o:£ air-
craft for visit and sear·ch, 
The Italian delegation accepted the British point of vie\v; it 
Inaintained that diversion of merchant vessels by surface war-
sbips was recognized and that the wording of the Washington 
treaty should be repeated. To prevPnt any abusive exercise of 
the right by aircraft, the Italian delegation proposed to add the 
following sentences to the paragraphs of the vVashington treaty 
as set out in the British text. 
A:fter the first paragraph add : 
"Visit must in general be earried out where the n1erchant vessel 
is first encountered. Nevertheless, in cases where it may be 
hnpossible to alight and there is at the same tilne good ground 
for suspicion, the aircraft 1nay order the 1nerchant vessel to 
deviate to a suitable locality, reasonably accessible, where she 
1nay be visited. If no good cause for this action is shown, the 
belligerent state must pay cmnpensation for the loss caused by 
the order to deviate." 
A:fter the third paragraph add: 
"If the 1nerchant vessel is in the territorial waters of the· 
enemy state and not on the high seas, she may be destroyed 
after previous notice has been given to the persons on board to· 
put then1selves in a place of safety and reasonable time has been 
given the·m for so doing." (1924 N. ,V. C., International Law 
Documents, p. 140.) 
J(l).panese attitude, 1928.-The Japanese were not sc 
closely concerned with the narrower legal aspects o:f visit 
and search~ though their courts had, when called upon, 
u~ually :followed generally accepted rules. The opera-
tion o:£ any rules that might be proposed was, however~ 
to them a matter o:£ grave importance. The report o:f the 
commlSSlon says: 
The Japanese view was based on the practical difficulty in the 
way of exercise of the right of visit and search by aircraft. Visit 
nnd search is a necessary preliminary to capture. and unless nn 
aircraft is physically capable of carrying it out, the recognition·. 
of the right of military aircraft to conduct operations against 
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merchant vessels may lead to a recurrence of the excesses prac-
ticed against enemy and neutral merchant vessels in the sub-
marine campaign initiated during the recent war. Therefore, 
the Japanese delegation preferred not to recognize the right at 
all. But in the end, as the amended American text removed the 
greater part of their fear of possible abuse, they expressed readi-
ness to accept it, a.nd suggested at the same time that the text had 
better be completed by the addition of the last sentence of the Brit-
ish text. (1924 N. vV. C., International Law Documents, p. 139.) 
Report of co1nndttee of jwrists, 1923.-The co1nn1ittee 
of jurists considering the rules for aircraft in time of 'var 
particularly referred to The Hague Convention of 1907 
and the report of the committee of jurists specifically 
supports the right of a neutral to prescribe the use of its 
aerial space under penalty of internment. In general 
the proposed rules prohibit the entrance of belligerent 
aircraft to the jurisdiction of a neutral state, but the 
report says: 
'Vhile they .remain on board the warship they form part of it, 
and should. be regarded as such from the point of view of regu-
lations issued by the neutral states. They will therefore be 
allowed to enter the neutral jurisdiction on the same footing as 
the warship on board which they rest, but they must re1nain on 
board the warship and must not commit any act which the warship 
is not allowed to co1nmit. (1924 N.W.C., International Law Docu-
ments, p. 132.) 
Article 42 of the proposed rules states : 
.A. neutral government must use the means at its disposal to 
prevent the entry within its jurisdiction of belligerent military 
aircraft and to compel them to alight if they have entered such 
jurisdiction. 
A neutral government shall use the means at its disposal to 
intern any belligerent military aircraft which is within its juris-
diction after having alighted for any reason whatsoever, together 
with its crew and the passengers, if any. (Ibid., p. 133.) 
Division of opinion, 1923.-The con1mission of jurists 
in 1923 recognized the importance of rules in regard to 
visit and search by aircraft, and strove to reach an agree-
ment, yet it was impossible to agree. 
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When put to the vote the American proposal was supported 
by the Japanese and Netherlands delegations and opposed by the 
British, French, and Italian. The French proposal was opposed 
by the American, British,· Japanese, and Netherlands delegations. 
The British and Italian delegations explained that they could 
only support it if it was amplified in the way indicated in the 
British and Italian amendments. 
Although all the delegations concurred in the expression of a 
desire to adopt such rules as would assure the observance of the 
dictates of hu1nanity as regards the protection of the lives of 
neutrals and noncombatants, the commission, by reason of a di-
vergence of views as to the method by which this result would 
best be attained, was unable to agree upon an article dealing with 
the exercise of belligerent rights by aircraft against merchant 
vessels. The code of rules proposed by the commission, therefore, 
leaves the matter open for future regulation. (1924 N. W. C., In-
ternational Law Documents, p. 141.) 
The American proposal had prohibited diversion, 
·while under the British it had not been prohibited. The 
require1nent which might be read into the words " pro-
ceed as directed after seizure " was not settled. 
Aircraft and deviation.-The changing relations of 
neutral commerce in ti1ne of war o'ving to changes in 
instru1nents and methods of war has been particularly 
m.arked since 1900. Submarines and aircraft are a1nong 
the ne'v agencies. Of the effect of aircraft Spaight says: 
Deviation is likely to become the rule, not the exception, in 
future. Visit and search at sea by aircraft will alway& probably 
be difficult. The ransacking of a liner will certainly be a vrac-
tical impossibility. Even if visit sur place is declared obligatory, 
it is unlikely to be anything but perfunctory. But most prob-
ably there will be no visit at all. Ships \Vill be ordered to named 
ports, and if they take the risk of disobeying the order and per-
sist in disobeying it, they will be attacked and perhaps sunk. 
The conditions of 1915-1918 1nay be reproduced in an aggravated 
form. 
The position of neutral cmnmerce will indeed be well-nigh 
intolerable. Freedmn of the sea will be dead and gone. Neutral 
shipping will be policed and dragooned as it never has been before. 
It was scourged with whipS' in 1914-19,18; it will be scourged 
with scorpions in a future war. Because the complete interrUl)· 
tion of all neutral trade beneficial to the enemy will be nwrc 
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important than ever, because the grip on that trade will be tighter 
than ever and evasion more difficult, the conflict of belligerent 
and neutral interests will be sharper, the consequent disputes 
more bitter, and the danger of actual war with neutral states-
greater than in the past. (Aircraft and Commerce of vVar, P. 52.) 
Referring to the unratified treaty, Washington Confer-
ence of 1922, on submarines and noxious gases, Spaight 
said in 1924: 
The &econd paragraph of Section I of Article I prohibits attack 
upon a merchant vessel unless she refuses (a) to submit to visit 
and search after warning, or ( b) to proceed as directed after 
seizure. The apparent ilnplication of this provision is that she 
may not be attacked if &he refuses to proceed as directed before 
seizure. But such a deduction \Vould not be a justifiable one to. 
draw. According to a statement made by the British delegation 
at The IIague in 1923 and recorded in the report of the commis-
sion of jurists, the original wording of the article was modified 
for the express purpose of allowing a warship to compel a mer-
chant vessel to proceed to a de&ignated place for visit and search; 
that is, to "proceed as directed" before. seizure. The right to 
ilnpose a reasonable degree of deviation before ever the vessel was 
boarded was fully recognized and was preserved, according to the 
British view, in Article I of the treaty. (Air Power and War 
Rights, p. 468.) 
Discussion in 192'7.-In the discussions at the Naval 
War College in 1927 the subject of visit and sear·ch re-
ceived considerable attention (International La'v Situa-
6ons, pp. 43-72), and the conclusion reached was that-
Under existing international la\v the movements of neutral 
"essels on the high seas are subject to belligerent direction only 
when under belligerent control by a. prize crew or escorting· 
vessel. (Ibid. p. 72.) 
It was sho,vn that there had been 1nany new practices 
during 1914-1918, but in the r·esume it was said: 
If there is a right of visit and search, and that is at the present 
time admitted, there must be conceded the opportunity and con--
ditions making its exercise possible. This would imply the right 
to take the visited vessel to smooth or safe water, or to escort 
it to such a place, or to retain the custody of the visited vessel 
till arrival of a force adequate to exercise visit and search. 
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The sending of a vessel into port under a prize crew or escort 
presupposes a suspicion of liability to prize proceedings based on 
infonnatfon in possession of the visiting vessel at the time. Sus-
picion that all vessels may bE' found liable is not sufficient ground 
for indiscriminately sending in of merchant vessels. (Ibid, p. 71.) 
Preparatory disarrna1nent conference.-In a. draft con-
vention for the preparatory disarmament conference in 
article 19 the provisions of article 14 of the Washington 
treaty limiting naval armament received some attention, 
repeating article 14. The draft convention reads: 
ART. 19. No preparation shall be made in merchant ships in time 
of peace for the installation of warlike armament for the purpose 
of converting such ships. into vessels of war, other than the neces-
sary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 
6.1 inches (155 mm.) in caliber. 
[134. Article 19 gave rise to a short discussion. This article, 
which provides that no preparation shall be made in merchant 
ships for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose 
of converting such ships into vessels of war, nevertheless author-
izes the stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceed-
ing 6.1 inches ( 155 millhneters) in caliber. This exception to the 
rule as stated \Vas finally adopted. The Japanese delegation, 
however, reserved the right to raise the question of the limitation 
of aircraft equipment on merchant vessels, possibly at the confer-
ence itself. The Soviet delegation emphasized the importance of 
laying down that no preparations shall be made in n1erchant ships 
-with a view to converting such ships in war time into fighting 
units.] (U. S. Treaty Information Bulletin No. 16, January, 
1.931, p. 2:0.) 
Deviation for visit amd searrch.-A certain degree of 
deviation for visit and search has always been admitted 
as lawful. Such deviation has been co1nmon when, be-
cause the state of the sea made it impossible to visit and 
search when the summoned vessel has come to, the vessel 
is escorted to a safer place. This is not an arbitrary act 
of the visiting vessel. The ordering of a neutral vessel 
to go to a port for examination as has been proposed at 
times is an exercise of authority ·which a belligerent craft 
does not possess. 
A surface or submarine vessel of 'var is not to be 
allowed to deviate a merchant vessel from its course un-
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less a prize crew is put on board or an escort is furnished. 
A rriere order is of no effect, as the merchant vessel is not. 
subject to the orders but may be under the physical con-
trol of a vessel of war so long as that is effective. Until 
other rules are accepted, this principle would apply to 
aircraft. The physical presence of the aircraft or of a 
prize crew would therefore be necessary for control of 
the Trader. 
'I'he submarine, according to article 22 of the London 
naval treaty, must "conform to the rules of international 
law to 'vhich surface vessels are subject," must place the· 
"passengers, cre,v, and ship's papers in a place of safety" 
unless there has been "persistent refusal to stop on be-
ing duly summoned" or "active resistance to visit or 
search." 
Resun~e.-'The A1nerican delegation, according to the· 
report of the con1mission of jurists in 1923, took a posi-
tion some,vhat different in principle from that proposed 
at \Vashington in 1922, while the British delegation fol-
lo,ved more closely the principles in the proposed Wash-
ington treaty. 'There was much difference of opinion as. 
to the right of visit and search by aircraft, and not even 
a 1najority of votes of the delegations could be secured for 
any rule. There vvas, ho,vever, a general consensus that 
the use of aircraft against merchant vessels should be reg-
ulated. It was admitted that under present conditions it 
'vould be in n1ost cases necessary to direct the 1nerchant 
vessel to son1e place suitable for visit by aircraft or where 
visit and search could be otherwise conducted. It might 
be necessary for a merchant vessel to go far from her 
course at great loss and inconvenience to obey orders of 
an aircraft which had no well-grounded suspicion war-
ranting interference. The delegations were not in agree-
ment as to whether vessels of war had any recognized 
right to cause a merchant vessel to change her course in 
absence of evidence at the time in possession of the com-
mander of the vessel of war, and not merely that a vessel 
in regard to which he had no evidence might be more ef-
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fecti.vely overhauled to discover whether she 1night be 
liable to visit and seareh. Grav~ extensions of the ac-
cepted rules in regard to the right of visit and search had 
been resorted to in the World War and extreme vie,vs 
were entertained by some in 1923. 
The French delegation at The Hague in 1923 submitted 
·a rule which was indefinite and left many of the debatable 
questions unsettled because it merely affirmed that the 
rule for surface craft in regard to which there was dis-
agreement should be applicable to aircraft. 
The proposed French text was: 
Aircraft are forbidden to operate against merchant vessels, 
whether surface or sub1narine, without conforming to the rules to 
which surface warshil)s are subject. (1924 N. W. C., International 
La \V Documents, p. 138.) 
1,he American draft \vould specifically forbid the di-
version of a merchant vessel prior to the boarding, 
though, as in case of a surface ship, a merchant vessel 
might be detained temporarily till conditions made board-
ing possible. 
To allow an aircraft or a submarine exceptional privi-
leges in the conduct of visit and search because of 'veak-
ness or incapacity does not see1n logical. A surface ves-
sel of war' is allowed to use shell fire against a merchant 
vessel which disregards a sum1noning blank shot, and in 
general the vessel of war is under obligations as to the 
safety of the passengers and crew. In similar circum-
stances an aircraft could rarely make provisions for the 
safety of passengers and cre1V after summons. Granting 
that aircraft construction remains relatively as at pres-
ent, to admit so1ne of the claims made as to aircraft rights 
in time of 'var would be to assume that the right of an 
instrument of war 'vould be in jnverse ratio to its capac-
ity to catry out such rights or that disability gave ex-
ceptional rights. 
Some of the argun1ents put forward during the 'Vorld 
War in regard to taking or sending in merchant vessels 
for visit and search may equally apply to submarines and 
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aj rcra:ft, and i:f generally accepted would 1nake possible 
almost unlimited interference with neutral mariti1ne com-
Inerce. 
Application of principles.-In the situation as stated, 
the Trader has come to in response to sumn1ons and has 
not refused to stop nor has the Traxler offered any r·e-
sistance. Effective control ceased when the aircraft de-
parted. The order to lie to and 'vait is not an effective 
control, and the Trader is not more bound by it than 
by an order· to go to a designated port without a prize 
cre'v or escort. The subn1arine has no right to sink the 
Trade1~, as it has not violated any o:f the provisions of 
article 22 o:f the London naval treaty and the sub1narine 
has not con:for1ned in its action to the obligations o:f that 
treaty. 
Obligation of neutral crttiser.-,Vhen a neutral cruiser 
is in the vicinity o:f any action involving a merchant ves-
sel o:f its flag, it should endeavor to assure the observance 
o:f law by the merchant vessel and to protect it :from 
any violation o:f la'v 'vhich 'vould injure the 1nerchant 
vessel. In case o:f need, it should render such assistance 
as possible. In this situation (a) the Trade?" has been 
sunk and the cruiser should rescue the personnel and con-
vey them to a place o£ safety, reporting in detail the cir-
cumstances to the proper authority. 
SOLUTION 
(a) ( 1) The action of the submarine is not la w:ful, 
and (2) the cruiser o:f the United States should afford 
such aid as possible in rescuing the personnel o:f the 
Trader and report the circu1nstances in detail to the 
proper authority. 
(b) Oanals in war time. 
Suez Oanal treaty.-The treaty of October 29, 1888, 
signed by nine powers, including Turkey, in the pre-
amble indicated the wish " to establish by a conventional 
act a definite system destined to guarantee at all times 
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and for all the povvers the free use of the Suez Maritime 
Canal." Among the articles of the convention for this 
purpose were the following : 
ARTICLE I. The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and 
open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of com-
merce or of war, without distinction of flag .. 
Consequently the high contracting parties agree not in any 
'vay to interfere with the free use of the canal in time of war 
as in tilne of peace. 
The canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of 
blockade. 
ART. IV. The maritime canal remaining open in time of war 
as a free passage, even to the ships of war of belligerents, accord-
ing to the terms of Article I of the present treaty, the high con-
tracting parties agree that no right of war, no act of hostility, 
nor any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation 
of the canal, shall be committed in the canal and its ports of 
access, as well as within a radius of 3 marine miles from those 
ports, even though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the 
belligerent powers. 
Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or take in 
stores in the canal and its ports of access, except in so far as may 
be strictly necessary. The transit of the aforesaid vessels through 
the canal shall be effected with the least possible delay, in ac-
cordance with the regulations in force, and without any other 
intermission than that resulting . from the necessities of the 
service. 
Their stay at Port Said and in the roadstead of Suez shall not 
exceed 24 hours, except in case of distress. In such case they 
shall be bound to leave as soon as possible. An interval of 24 
hours shall always elapse between the sailing of a belligerent 
ship from one of the ports of access and the departure of a ship 
belonging to the hostile power. 
AnT. Y. In time of war belligerent powers shall not disembark 
nor ernbark within the canal and its ports of access either troops, 
munitions, or materials of war. But in case of an accidental 
hindrance in the canal men may be en1barked or disembarked at 
the ports of access by detachments not exceeding 1,000 men, with 
a corresponding amount of war material. 
ART. VI. Prizes shall be subjected in all respects to the same 
rules as the vessels of war of belligerents. (British Parliamen-
tary Papers, Commercial No. 2 (1889), C--5623, p. 5.) 
Oo1n1nents on draft in 1887.-In 1887 the Marquis ot 
Salisbury, in co1nmenting on the clauses of the draft 
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h eaty, 'vhich 'vere, save :for slight changes £or clarity, 
identical with the treaty o£ 1888, said o£ son1e o£ the 
differences o:f opinion : 
A second point upon which con&iderable controversy has arisen 
is the extent to which the contracting powers, for the purpose of 
securing the neutrality of the canal, should renounce their natural 
liberty in respect to acts of war or preparations for war. The 
project of treaty presented at the last sitting of the ~onunission 
by Great Britain prohibited the " stntioning" of any ship& of war 
in the canal or its ports by a belligerent or the stationing of 111ore 
than two by any power in time of peace. But it was contended, 
not only on the part of the French Government but of the large 
1najority of the commission, that all acts of war and all acts 
directed immediately to the preparation of an operation of war 
should be forbidden not only in the canal but in the ports of 
access, in the approaches to it, and in the territorial waters of 
Egypt; and the fifth article of the project of treaty protocolled 
at the clo&ing session as representing the views of the ma jority 
of the powers runs in those tern1s. As the result of discussions 
which have taken place ~ubsequently, I believe the Govennnent of 
France are willing to admit material 1nodifications of this article. 
To Her l\Iajesty's Government any reference to the " approache&" 
of the canal (which would include the Red Sea), or to the terri-
torial waters of Egypt, independent of the canal, appears to be 
open to grave objections. It is not necessary for the neutraliza-
tion of the canal that these waters should be in any way affected 
by the provisions of the treaty. ller l\1ajesty's Govenunent must 
al&o adhere to the objection expressed by my predecessor to the 
inclusion among the list of acts prohibited in the " ports of ac-
cess" of "acts having for their object the direct 11reparation of an 
operation of war," even in time of peace. Such a provision mip;ht 
operate as a 1naterial hindrance to the preparations required for 
the defense of Egypt. 
Similar considerations affected the sixth article of the project 
sanctioned by the majority of the powers in 1885, to which strong 
objection was taken by the British delegates. It consisted of a 
prohibition of the embarkation or debarkation of troops, muni-
tions, or material of war, either in the canal or its ports of ac-
cess, in time of war or in time of peace. This article appears to 
Her Majesty's Gover1nnent now, as it did to the British delegates, 
to be far too wide in its application. The prohibition should be 
eonfined, in the first place, to times of war and to actual . bellig-
erents. The British delegates further contended that it should 
only apply to the canal, and not to the "ports of access." To this 
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contention it is replied that if the landing of armies for hostile 
purposes was going on at the mouth of the canal, efforts \YOulcl 
certainly be made by the other belligerent to prevent the de-
barkation, and the prohibition of hostilities in the canal would 
become illusory. The difficulty felt by Her Majesty's Govenuuent 
in assenting to the inclusion of the ports of access in this pro-
hibition arises not from any desire to see the1n used for belliger-
ent purposes, but because it n1ight in time of- war be a serious 
ilnpedilnent to the transit across the isthmus of reliefs for India, 
if the canal happened to be temporarily blocked. ( Br. Pari. 
Paper, Egypt No. 1 ( 1888) , C. 5255, p. 41.) 
On November 4, 1887, a circular o£ the Marquis of 
Salisbury to the British representatives at Berlin, Vienna,. 
Madrid, Ron1e, The Hague, St. Petersburg, Constanti-
nople, and Cairo, contained a copy o£ a letter o£ October 
26, 1887, to the British representative at Paris, in 'vhich 
'vas rene,ved the reservation 1nade by Sir Julian Paunce-
£ote at the close o£ the sittings o£ the commission o£ 
1885. It 'vas to the £ollo,ving effect: 
Les DeU~gues de la Grande-Bretagne, en presentant ce texte de 
Traite conune le regin1e definitif destine a garantir le libre usage 
du Canal de Suez, pensent qu'il est de leur devoir de fonuuler 
une reserve generale quant a !'application de ces dispositions en 
tant qu'elles ne seraient pas compatibles avec l'etat transitoire 
et exceptionnel oft se trouve actuelle1nent l'Egypte, et qu'elles 
pourraient entraver la liberte d'action de leur Gouvernement pen-
dant la periocle de !'occupation cle l'Egypte par les forces de Sa 
l\iajeste Britannique. (Ibid, p. 36.) 
0£ this, Pro£. T. E. Holland, o£ Oxford, 1vriting to 
the London Times on October 9, 1898, said: 
1. It is certainly n1y opinion, for what it is worth, that the 
full operation of the couvpntion of 1888 is suspended by the 
reserves first n1ade on behalf of this country during the sittings 
o£ the conference of 1885. These reserves were texually re-. 
pe-ated by Lord Salisbury in his dispatch of October 21, 1887, 
inclosing the draft convention which three days later was signed 
at Paris by the representatives of France and Great Britain, the 
1 wo powers which, with the assent of the rest, had been carrying 
on the resumed negotiations with reference to the canal. Lord 
Salisbury's language was also carefully brought to the notice of 
ea• II of the other powers concerned in the course of the some--
SUEZ CANAL, 1898 
what protracted dh;cussions which preceded the final signature 
of the sa1ne convention at Constantinople on October 29', 1888. 
2. All the signatories of the convention having thus become 
parties to it after express notice of " the conditions under which 
Her :Majesty's Governn1ent have expressed their willingne·ss to 
agree to it/' 1nust, it can hardly be doubted, share the view that 
the con ,·ention is operative only sub modo. 
3. Supposing the convention to lJave become operative, and 
supposing the territorial power to be neutral in a war between 
~tates which ·we may call A and B, the convention would cer-
tainly entitle A to clahn unmolestetl pas:sage for its ships of 
war on their way to attack the forces of ll in the eastern seas. 
(Letters on 'Yar and Neutrality, 3d eel.. 1881-1920, p. 54.) 
Brititsh Gove1'n1lz,ent attitur21e, 18.98.-ln July, 1898, 
questions were raised in regard to sojourn of Spanish. 
\Tesscls of \Yar at Port Said and involving the Suez Canal 
conyention. l\Ir. Curzon, Under Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, replied: 
The provisions of the Suez Canal convention to which the 
honorable me1nber refers have never been brought into operation .. 
'The question of the duration of stay of foreign vessels at Port 
Said is one prilnarily for the decision of the Egyptian Govern-
ment, and there has doubtless been good reason for the course 
adopted in this case. 
l\Ir. DAVITT. Can the right honorable gentleman state what 
these reasons were? 
l\Ir. CURzON. I am not in the immediate councils of the Egyptian. 
Govern1nent, so I can not inform the honorable member. 
l\fr. GIBSON BOWLES (Lynn Regis). Did I understand the right 
honorable gentlen1an to say that the convention of 1888 is not in 
actual operation? 
l\Ir. CURzoN. Yes; the honorable member did understand me 
to say so. (60 Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, p. 800.) 
Later on lVIr. Gibson Bo,vles said on July 12, 1898: 
I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
whether the convention between Great Britain, Austria, France, . 
Gennany, Italy, the Netherlands, Rus~ia, Spain, and Turkey, 
which was signed at Constantinovle on October 29, 1888, and the 
ratifications whereof were deposited at Constantinople on Decein-
ber 22, 1888, and whereof the first article declares that the Suez. 
Canal shall always be free and open in time of war as in time 
of pence to every vessel of commerce or of war without distinc--
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tion of flag i& still in existence and in operation; and, if not, 
whether he can say when and under what circumstances that 
·convention ceased to exist or to operate? 
l\1r. CuR.zoN. The convention in question is certainly in exist-
ence, but, as I informed the honorable me1nber in reply to a ques-
tion some days ago, has not been brought into practical operation. 
This is owing to the reserve& made on behalf of Her l\1ajesty's 
Government by the British delegates at the Suez Canal Commis-
sion in 1885, which were renewed by Lord Salisbury, and com-
nnlnicated to the powers in 1887. They will be found at page 292 
of the Parlian1entary Paper, Egypt, No. 19, 1885. 
l\1r. GrnsoN BowLES. Do these reserves made in 1887 override 
the treaty of 1888? 
1\ir. CURzoN. I do not express any definite opinion as to the 
word "override," but they are no doubt responsible for the fact, 
a& I have alrea(ly twice stated, that the terms of the convention 
have not been brought into practical operation. (61 Ibid., p. 667.) 
HClfl;-Pauncefote treaty, 1901.-The treaty o£ 1901 be-
t,veen the United States and Great Britain settled many 
long-standing differences between the two states in regard 
to transisthmian rights. By the treaty a "canal may be 
constructed under the auspices of the Government of the 
United States." In article 3 of the treaty it 'vas pro-
vided that-
The United States adopts, as the basis of the neutralization 
of such ship canal, the following rules, substantially as e1nbodied 
in the convention of Constantinople, signed October 28, 1888/ for 
the free na·dgation of the Suez Canal ; that is to say: 
1. The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of comn1erce 
nnd of war of all nations observing these rules on tern1s of entire 
equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any 
such nation or its citizens or subjects in respect of the conditions 
oe charges of traffic or otherwise. Such conditions and charges 
of traffic shall be just and equitable. 
2. The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of 
war be exercised nor any !let of hostility be committed within it. 
·The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such 
1nilitary police along the canal as may be necessary to protect 
it against lawlessness and disorder. 
3. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not revictual nor take 
any stores in the canal except so far as n1ay be strictly necessary, 
1 It is nppar~ntly the convention of October 29, 1888, to which refer-
·ence is made. 
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.and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected 
with the least possible delay in accordance with the regulations 
in force, and with only such intern1ission as may result from the 
necessities of the service. 
Prizes shall be in all respect subject to the san1e rules as 
vessels of war of the belligerents. 
4. No be1ligerent shall embark or disembark troops, n1unitions 
of war, or warlike materials in the canal except in case of acci-
dPntal hindrance of the transit, and in such case the transit shall 
be resumed with all 11ossible dispa tell. 
5. The provisions of this article shall apply to waters adjacent 
to the canal within 3 n1arilw miles of either end. Yessels of war 
of a be1ligerent shall not remain in such waters longer than 24 
hours at any one thne excE:pt in case of distress, and in such 
case shall devn rt as soon ns possible; but a vessel of war of one 
belligerent shall not de11art within 24 hours fr01n the departure 
of a ves~el of war of the other belligerent. 
6. ~rhe plant, establishment, buildings, and all work necessary 
to the construction~ 1naintenance, and operation of the canal shall 
b(' dee1ned to be part thereof for the 11urposes of this treaty, and 
in thne of war as in tilne of peace shall enjoy con1plete inununity 
from attack or injury by belligerents and from acts calculated 
to impair their u:;efulness af.: l)art of the canal. ( 32. U. S. Stat., 
pt 2·, p. 1903.) 
British opinion on Panama Oanal.-J. H. Hall, in his 
book on the Law of Naval vVarfare, of which the second 
edition appeared in 1921, after discussing the status of 
the Suez Canal, turns his attention briefly to the Panama 
Canal, saying: 
The Panama Canal is governed by the tern1s of the Hay-
Pauncefote treaty made between Great Britain and the United 
States of America in 1901. The canal is pern1anently neutralized 
and the 1naintenance of that status is insured by the terms of 
article 3, in which is laid down a series of rules substantially 
the same as those e1nboclied in the Suez Canal convention. The 
canal was formally opened on August 16, 1914. Under the tenns 
of their treaty with the Panan1a Republic the United States 
Govern1nent a fortnight later took over the control of all wireless 
telegraph stations, fixed or nwvable, in the Republic, and on Octo-
ber 10 the two Governments signed a 11rotocol agreeing that 
during a war in which their respective countries were neutral 
hospitality to a belligerent warship, transport, or fleet auxiliary 
accorded in the territorial waters of the Panan1a Republic should 
69574-31--9 
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serve to deprive such vessel of like hospitality in the Canal Zone 
for the ensuing three months and vice versa. On November 13 
the United States Government issued neutrality regulations for 
the Canal Zone which conform in general with the rules of the 
Thirteenth Hague convention in regard to the use of neutral 
ports by belligerent warships and silnilar vessels. Two points, 
however, are deserving of special notice. The normal rule ad-
Initting only three warships of a belligerent at one time is modified 
by allowing three to be in the terminal ports of the canal as well 
as three on passage, making it permissible for there to be a total 
n1aximum of six in the Canal Zone at one time. The rules of 
priority of departure and 24 hours interval as between the vessels 
of opposing belligerents are modified in the case of a belligerent 
warship \Vhich returns within a \Veek of her previous departure 
by depriving such vessel of precedence of departure over enemy 
vessels, which arrive after her return and before the expiration 
of a week subsequent to her previous departure; the canal au-
thorities are empowered to regulate the departure of such a ves-
sel as they think fit with a view to preventing a constant reap-
pearance in this 1nanner, resulting in practice in a b:ockade of the 
canal against the vessels of the opposing belligerent (p. 181). 
The Suez Oanal.-During the \Vorld War the status of 
the Suez Canal naturally became a subject of change 
o'ving to the relations of Turkey and of Egypt as 'veil 
as the relation of other political entities to the war. In 
January, 1915, questions can1e before the British prize 
court in Egypt in regard to the Ger1nan stea1nshi p 
Gutenfels, 'vhich had on August 5, 1914, arrived at Port 
Said. A " decision " of the Egyptian Governn1ent of 
August 5, 1914, gave permission to Gern1an vessels to 
leave Egyptian ports up to sunset August 14. The 
Grwtenfels remained at Port Said till " On October 13, she 
'vas boarded by an officer of the Egyptian Army, and her 
1naster 'vas inforn1ed that the Egyptian Government had 
taken possession of her, and that a ne'v 1naster and cre'v 
'vould be sent on board. On October 16, 'vith the Egyp-
tian authorities still on board, she proceeded to sea, and 
'vhen 3 or 4 miles out 'vas formally seized by H. l\.f. S. 
lVarrior and brought to Alexandria." (1 Trehern, Br. 
and Col. Prize cases, p. 102.) The German owners main-
tained that the court should take under consideration all 
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the circu1nstances involved and not merely the capture 
by the lV arrior, and this the court ad1nitted and says: 
Having e-stablished this point in their favor, the owners pray 
restoration of their vessel on the ground that Port Said is a 
neutral port, whose neutrality has been guaranteed by the Suez 
Canal convention; and it becomes our duty to consider what is 
the position of enemy ships which have taken refuge in the port. 
Are they entitled to immunity from capture while lying at anchor 
having no intention to pass through the canal, or does immunity 
only extend to them for such reasonable time as may be necessary 
to enable the1n to make a passage through it? (Ibid., p. 108.) 
1\.fter considering the arrangements bet\veen the canal 
con1pany and the Egyptian Government, the court finds 
nothing in the arrangements which can give rights to 
third parties like the German o\vners, and the case 
continues: 
But there is another aspect of the question which has been 
lJrought alJcut b~' the international convention of October 29, 1888, 
g·uaranteeing th~ free use of the Suez Canal, and commonly re-
ferred to as the Suez Canal convention. To this. convention all 
tlle great European powers and the Sultan of Turkey were 
parties: 
''Article 1 declares that-
" The Suez 1\fari time Canal shall always be free and open, in 
time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or 
of war, without distinction of flag. Consequently the high con-
tracting parties agree not in any way to interfere with the free 
use of the canal, in time of war as in time of peace. The canal 
shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade." 
Article 4, which is the special article upon which the claimants 
rely, reads as follows: 
" The maritime canal remaining open in time of war as a free 
passage even to the ships of war of belligerents, according to 
Article I of the present treaty, the high contracting parties agree 
that no right of war shall be exercised, nor shall any act of hos-
tility, or any act having for its object to obstruct the free navi-
gation of the canal, be co1nmitted in the canal and its ports of 
access, nor within a radius of 3 marine miles from those ports, 
even though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent 
powers"; and special provision is made as to the passage and 
victualing of vessels of war. (Ibid., p. 110.) 
124 BELLIGERENT AIRCRAFT 
Other articles provide for oversight and protection of 
the canal and that in other respects the sovereign rights of 
t};le Sultan of Turkey and the Khedive of Egypt" are not 
to be affected." Of this the court says : 
In view of these provisions there is a grim touch of humor about 
the present situation, seeing that the Ottoman Government, under 
Gennan direction, is at this mmnent seeking to destroy the canal, 
while a German ship taken by the Egyptian Government asks in a 
.British prize court for a declaration of release on the ground that 
the canal precincts are absolutely inviolable. 
The passages that I have cited are all that, in my opinion, are 
material fo the issue. Can it be said that this convention giYes 
the right to any ship to shelter itself indefinitely, or at all, in 
the ports ancillary to the canal because they happen to be within 
the limits of the operations of the canal cmnpany? I think not. 
In my opinion, the sole object of the treaty, as expressed both in 
its prea1nble and operative articles, is to insure a free and 
uninterrupted passage of the canal at all tilnes to all ships of all 
nations of the world; and if in the unlikely event of a Gennan 
ship now entering Suez or Port Said and demanding a free pas-
sage, I think it would be the plain duty of the British Government 
(after taking proper precautions to prevent damage to the canal 
itself) to allow such ship to pass through and sail out at the 
other end; and I have no reason to suppose that the British Gov-
ernment would fail in its duty. But that is. the limit of its obli-
gation ; and if a ship enters Suez or Port Said without any inten-
tion of going through the canal, or, being in either of those ports. 
abandons any intention it 1nay have had of passing through~ I 
am of opinion that she ceases to have any rights whatever under 
the convention. The object of the convention is to insure a free 
passage through the canal, and nothing else, and all prohibitions 
against acts of hostility within the canal precincts are fran1ed 
·with that object and that alone. (Ibid., p. 111.) 
Suez Canal and Port Sa:id.-In 1914 several Gern1an 
Inerchant vessels \V hich entered Port Said claimed protec-
tion under that part of article 4 of the Suez Canal con-
vention of 1888, \vhich is as follo-ws: 
The marithne canal remaining oven in tilne of war as a free 
passage, even to the ships of \Var of the belligerents, according-
to the terms of article 1 of the present treaty, the high contracting 
parties agree that no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any act 
having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the canal, 
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shall be committed in the canal and its ports of acces~, as well 
as within a radius of 3 marine miles fr01n those ports, even though 
the Ottoman En1pire should be one of the belligerent powers. (2 
Grant, Br. and Col. Prize Cases, p. 148n.) 
These vessels ·were by persons e1n ployecl by the Egyp-
tian authorities taken outside territorial \Vaters, where 
they \vere i1nmediately captured by British vessels o£ \Var 
and taken before a prize conrt, \vhere they \Yere con-
demned as good prize. The case o£ the Pindos making 
~' a round voyage from Antwerp to eastern Niedi terranean 
ports," the II elgolavnd " bound ,vith general cargo £ro1n 
Singapore to Rotterdam and Bre1nen," and the Rostock 
c:une at the s~nne ti1ne before the judicial committee o£ 
the Privy Council on appeal~ and in dis1nissing the appeal 
their lordships jn part said: 
The Rostocl~ was a steamship of 4,957 tons gross "·hich be-
longed to the Deutsche-Australische Dampfschiffsgesellschaft, of 
IIa1nburg. She came through the Suez Canal fron1 eastern ports 
with general cargo bound, no doul>t, for a h01ne port, and arriYed 
at Port Sai(l on July 31 and began to discharge such part of her 
crn·go as was deliverable there. \Vhile doing so her captain re-
ceived a cablegrain fr01n his owners at 1Ha1nburg to \vait further 
orders. His log ~ecords on August 1: " In order to protect ship 
and cargo frmn the attacks of the ene1ny shall re1nain until 
further notice in Port Said, as the harbor is neutral." On 
August 17 to 19 the ship discharged her cargo of frozen meat. 
After July 31 the captain received no further communication from 
his owners. He was treated by the Egyptian authorities in respect 
of the offer of a pass, the actual delivery of a valid pass subse-
quently, and the removal of his ship outside Egyptian territorial 
waters, exactly as the captains of the Pindos and the Helgoland 
were treated. He beha Yed in the same way and for the same 
reasons. The Rostock was captured by the lVarrior on October 
15 and was condemned as prize on February 17, 1915. 
The claimants in their petitions formally relied on what in each 
case were substantially the same defenses-namely, first, the 
benefit of the Sixth Hague Convention of 1907, articles 1 and 
2; secondly, the benefit of article 4 of the Suez Canal convention 
of 1888, confirmed by article 6 of the Anglo-French agreement of 
1904; thirdly, the formal invalidity and the practical inefficiency 
of the passes which were offered by the Egyptian authorities; 
and fourthly, considerations of equity and natural justice arising 
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out of the circtnnstances under which the ships were ejected fro1n 
Egyptian waters. 
Of these points the first l1as already been dealt with sufficiently 
by their lordships in the case of The Gutenfel8 [1916] (ante, p. 
36; 85 L. J. P. C. 140), and the third in that of The Achaia, [1916] 
(ante, p. 45: 85 L. J. P. C. 155). Of the second all that need be 
said is this: 'Vhatever question can be raised as to the parties to 
and between whmn the Suez Canal convention, 1888, is applicable, 
and as to the interpretation of its articles, one thing is p:ain, 
that the convention is not applicable to ships which are using 
Port Said, not for the purposes of passage through the Suez Canal 
or as one of its ports of access, but as a neutral port in "Which to 
seclude then1selves for an indefinite thne in order to defeat bellig-
erents' rights of capture after abandoning any intention which 
there 1nay ever have been to use the port as a port of access in 
connection with transit through the canal. Those responsible 
for the ships took their course deliberately, and took it before 
August 14. The captains appear, as was only natural, to have 
consulted together and to have acted in concert. In the case of 
the Helgola,nd her O\vners in Bre1nen, doubtless well-informed 
persons, as early as Thursday, July 30, 1914, if not earlier, 
\Yere so assure<J, though no ultimatum had then been issued, 
that Gennany would shortly be at war, and England and 
Egypt would be neutral ; that they ordered her captain to stop in 
Port Said instead of trying to reach a Turkish, a Greek, an 
Italian, or an Austrian port. It is no light responsibility to stop 
a ship of over 5,000 tons with general cargo in n1idvoyage for an 
indefinite period, and thus to in1peril insurances alike on ship and 
cargo, and to incur heavy expenses and probably heavy claims 
fro1n cargo owners as well ; but this responsibility was taken. 
Their lordships are of opinion that the evidence atnply justified 
the decision of the prize court in each case ; that the ships were 
using Port Said shnply as n. port of refuge, and therefore without 
any right or privilege arising out of the Suez Canal convention, 
1888. Hence their expulsion by the Egyptian authorities when 
it had become plain that they \Vould not leave of the1nselves 
affords no answer to the claim for conde1nnation in natural jus-
tice, or equity, or law. (Ibid., p. 148.) 
Oase of the "Derfflinger."-The Derjflinge1" W'as a Ger-
Inan vessel which by its build shoV\red that it was intended 
for conversion into a vessel of 'var. Coming from the 
east, she passed through the Suez Canal, arriving at Port 
Said August 2, 1914. The Hague convention in regard 
to days of grace does not apply to vessels "Whose build 
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sho"·s they are intended for conversion into vessels of 
"·ar. The log of the Derfflinger had the following 
entries: 
1914, August 2: Arriyecl Port Said. The journey can not be 
<'ontinued on account of the war. 
August 3: Passengers and baggage landed. (2 Grant, Br. and 
Co1. Prize Cases, p. 3G.) 
The judgment of the judicial con1mittee of the Privy 
Council stated : 
Under the Internationnl Suez Canal convention of 1889, she was 
entitled to use the canal for the purposes of passage. She had used 
it, and the aboYe entries show that her voyage of passage was over; 
that her journey '\Yas, in her view, rendered abortive by reason 
of the war, and that she had accordingly landed her passengers 
and cargo. Port Said was, on August 2 and 3, a neutral port. 
The war '\Vhicb caused the discontinuance of the ship's voyage was 
the war between Germany and France and that between Germany 
and Russia. "\Vhen war broke out on August 4 between Germany 
and Great Britain the vessel was lying in Port Said, not in 
cxerch;e of a right of passage but by way of user of the port as a 
port of refuge. 
Under these circumstances the canal convention had ceased 
to be operative and she was not entitled to any protection. The 
ship was a German ship lying in an enen1y port, and was a shfp 
to which the IIague conYention did not apply. (Ibid, p. 44.) 
l{iel Oanal.-Article 380 of the treaty of Versailles 
June 28, 1919, provided that that canal should be open 
to Yessels of co1n1nerce and of war in terms son1e,vhat 
silnilar to those used in the Suez and Panama conven-
tions: 
ART. 380. The Kiel Canal and its approaches shall be main-
tained free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all 
nations at peace \vith Ger1nany on terms of entire equality. 
Questions arose in regard to this clause in 1921. The 
lVirnbledon, a British vessel, chartered by a French com-
pany, carrying 1nunitions loaded at Salonica bound for 
Poland via Danzig, had been refused permission by Ger-
n1any to pass through the Kiel Canal on March 21, 1921. 
'rhe German neutrality in the war between Russia and 
J>oland was given as the reason for the refusal. 
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This action o:£ Germany Cfl.me be:fore the Permanent. 
Court o:£ International Justice and \Vas the subject o:£ its 
first judgment commonly known as the case o:£ the lV im-
bledo1l~. The judgment \vas rendered August 17, 1923, 
and in addition to Ger1nany the parties were Great 
Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Poland. 
Sir Cecil 1-Iurst, speaking be:fore the court :for Great 
Britain, said: 
In each of the international instruments, therefore, "·hich fix 
the regin1e for the Suez Canal and for the Panama Canal, respec-
tively, words are e1nployed which are identical with those used 
in article 380 of the treaty of Versailles with regard to the 
Kiel Canal. I think it is reasonable to ask the court to draw 
the inference that if the framers of the treaty of Versailles used 
identical language with regard to the I{iel Canal to that ·which 
had been used in regard to the Suez and Panama Canals, they 
intended to establish for the Kiel Canal a regin1e analagous to 
that which existed in regard to those other great maritime ·water-
ways. (Publications of the Pennanent Court of International 
Justice, series C, No. 3, vol. 1, p. 254.) 
Now, what really is the r·egime which has been created for 
these other waterways at Suez and Panama? They have been 
constituted into highways open for all kinds of navigation, not 
merely the navigation of com1nerce, but also for the more serious 
navigation of war. They have been constituted in this way into 
great international high\vays; by instrun1ents \Vhich operate not 
merely as between the parties to those instruments, but \Vhich 
operate for the benefit of all nations. (Ibid. p. 256.) 
A:fter discussing the obligation o:£ neutral states to 
refuse to belligerent vessels of \Yar the use of their in-
land \vater\vays, Sir Cecil Hurst :further says: 
Does that principle apply to these great international water-
ways which I have mentioned-the Suez Canal, the Pana1na 
Canal, and the Kiel Canal? In the instnnnen ts regulating the 
regilne for those waterways, you will find in several places that 
the passage of warships is: provided for, and it is provided for· 
in tenns which enable those warships to pass even when they 
are the warships of a belligerent power and when the territorial 
sovereign of the area in which the canal is situated remains neu-
tral. 
Consequently, I think it is clear that the reghne established for· 
these great international waterways is, in matters relating to· 
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neutrality, a very special regime, and that the normal principles 
which obtain with regard to the obligations of neutrality do not 
attach to these watenvays at all. 
I have mentioned the case of ships of ·war, but that is not the 
only wa.y in which the question ari~es. There is not merely the 
question of ships of '"ar; tl1ere is the case of vessels which are 
assimilated to vessels of war-storeships, prizes, and so on. There 
is also the case of the ordinary transportation of contraband. 
(Ibid., p. 258.) 
In referring to arguments as to the analogy of the 
Suez and Panan1a Canals and the Kiel Canal, the Ger-
man representative before the court said: 
They argue that these various articles, having the same word-
ing have the same object, and involve the same rights and obli-
gations. 
Let us proceed to a c01nparison. 
~rhe Suez Canal act, Article I, paragraph 1, runs.: 
"The Suez l\Ia.ritime Canal shall always be free and open in 
time of war as in thne of peace, to every vessel of com1nerce or of 
war, without distinction of flag." 
The Pana1na Canal act, Hay-Pauncefote treaty of Nove1nber 18, 
1901, says: 
'~The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce 
and of war of all 1mtions observing these rules, on ter1ns of en-
tire equality." 
·The provisions referring to the I(iel Canal (article 380 of the 
treaty of Versailles) say : 
"The Kiel Canal and its approa.ches shall be Inaintained free 
and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at 
peace with Gennany on tern1s of entire equality." 
So it is true that the article relating to the I(iel Canal begins 
by a silnilar phrase to that used in the corresponding article in 
the Suez Canal conYention; but the sense of the· text as regards 
the I(iel Canal is narrower. It will be observed that the words 
" in time of war as in thne of peace" are lacking in the Kiel Canal 
article and the Panama Canal convention; they only appear in the 
Suez Canal convention. 
With regard to the I{iel Canal, the article limits freedom of 
passage to nations " at peace with Germany " ; and the Panama 
Canal convention has the words "observing these rules," subject-
ing the user of the canal to a series of regulations which are to be 
drawn up. In the French text of the Kiel Canal article the word 
" toujours " appears. but the word " always " does not appear i.n 
the English text. "Always" appears both in English and French 
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in the Suez Canal convention, where it does not at all appear in, 
the Panama convention. 
Article I, paragraph 1, of the Suez Canal convention, relating 
to freedom of passage, is followed by paragraph 2, 'vhich says : 
" Consequently, the high contracting parties agree not in any 
way to interfere with the free use of the canal in time of war as 
in time of peace." 
No such paragraph is found in the I(iel article, nor does it 
appear in the Panama Canal convention. 
Also paragraph 3 of Article I of the Suez Canal act relates to 
the impossibility of blockading the canal, so that it 1nust be 
considered as neutralized. Provisions to this effect are to be-
found in the Panama Canal convention, but not in the articles 
relating to the I(iel Canal. 
The provisions of article 381, paragraph 2, are not to be found 
either in the Suez or the Panama convention. 
As regards the question of defense, 'vhilst article 10 of the 
Suez convention admits the right to establish defenses on the 
Canal, Article II adds, " but not in such a way as to hinder the 
free passage of ships." Article 23 of the Hay-Pauncefote conven-
tion of 1903 adn1its the right of defense, unhindered by this re-
striction. (Ibid., p. 345.) 
In its decision the court considered that the l{iel Canal. 
had " ceased to be an internal and national waterway ,. 
and had become an " international 'vaterway " open to 
vessels of states at peace 'vith Germany, even if at waT 
with each other. The court also recognized that the 
rules were not the same for the Suez, Panama, and l{iel 
Canals, but that their' intent was to establjsh inter-
national 'vatetways of which the use by belligerents 
might not be incompatible with neutral obligations of 
the authority having jurisdiction along the route of the 
canal. The court says in the decision: 
The precedents therefore afforded by the Suez and Panama 
Canals invalidate in advance the argument that Germany's neu-
trality would have necessarily been hnperiled if her authorities 
had allowed the passage of the lVi1nbledon through the I(iel 
Canal, because that vessel 'vas carrying contraband of war con-
signed to a state then engaged in an annecl conflict. ~Ioreover 
they are merely illustrations of the general opinion according to 
which when an artificial waterway connecting two open seas has 
been permanently dedicated to the use of the whole world s-ach 
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waterway is assimilated to natural straits in the sense that even 
the passage of a belligerent man-of-\var does not compromise the 
neutrality of the sovereign state under whose jurisdiction the 
waters in question lie. (Idem., series A, p. 28.) 
SOLUTION 
(b) The action of the commander of the Hail in pro-
ceeding to a trial flight of the aircraft in a port of the 
state of Panama is not lawful. The co1nmander of the 
cruiser should report the circu1nstances in detail to the 
proper authority and a'vait instructions. 
(c) Panama Canal Zone. 
Treaties ~writh Panarna.-The treaties bet,veen the 
United States and Panan1a since 1903 have sho,vn a close 
relationship bet\\"een the t\vo states. The existence of 
the Pana.Ina Canal under the manage1nent of the United 
States and the control of the Canal Zone have made this 
essential to both states. Article I of the convention of 
1903 reads: 
'The United States guarantees and will mnintain the independ-
ence of the Republic of Panama. (33 U. S. Stat., 11t. 2, p. 223-1.) 
Pana11~a's neutrality, 1914.-The necessity of joint ac-
tion by the United States, and sometimes control in Pan-
an1a has been seen in 1nany acts. This is evident in De-
cree No. 130 of 1914: 
The President of the Hepublic, in the exercise of his legal 
powers, and considering : 
That by the tenns of the Bunau-Yarilla-Hay treaty the Republic 
of Panama is obliged to assist the United States by all necessary 
and suitable 1neasures for the conservation, protection, and de-
fense of the interoceanic canal constructed across the Isthnn1s: 
That the said Government considers it indispensable to this 
end that it shall assume fron1 now on permanent and complete coB-
trol of the wireless telegraphic stations, fixed and movable, in all 
the territory, and territorial waters of the Republic of Panama; 
and 
That it is to the interest and for the safety of the Republic 
of Panan1a that wireless cmnmunication be controlled and regu-
lated by the nation which by a solen1n pact has guaranteed it~ 
independence ; 
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It is decree<.l: From this date the radiotelegraphic stations, 
fixed and 1novable, and everything relating to wireless communi-
cations in the territory and territorial waters of Panama shall be 
under the con1plete and permanent control of the United States 
of America; and to attain that end said Govenunent will take the 
measures which it deem~ necessary. 
Let it be co1n1nunica ted and published. 
Done at Panama this 29th day of August, 1914. 
BELISARIO PORRAS. 
The Secretary of Govern1nent and Justice: 
JuAN B. SosA. 
(1914 U. S. For. Rel., p. #l051.) 
On October 10, 1914, an agreement 'vas entered 1nto 
bet-ween the United States and Panama: 
The undersigned, the Acting Secretary of State of the United 
States of A1nerica and the envoy extraordinary and rninister 
plenipotentiary of the Republic of Panama, in view of the close 
association of the interests of their respective Governments on the 
Isthmus of Panama, and to the end that these interests may be 
conserTed, and that \Vhen a state of war exists the neutral obli-
gations of both Governments as neutrals n1ay be 1naintained, 
after having conferred on the subject and being duly empowered 
by their respective Governments, have agreed: 
That hospitality extended in the· waters of the Republic of 
Panama to a belligerent vessel of war or a vessel belligerent or 
neutral, whether ar1ned or not, which is employed by a belligerent 
power as a transport or fleet auxiliary or in any other way for the 
direct purpose of prosecuting or aiding hostilities, whether by 
land or sea, shall serve to deprive such vessel of like hospitality 
in the Pana1na Canal Zone for a period of three months, and vice 
versa. 
In testimony whereof, the undersigned have signed and sealed 
the present protocol in the city of 'Vashington this lOth day of 
October, 1914. 
(38 U. S. Stat, pt. 2, p. 2042.) 
RoBERT LANSING. 
EusEBIO A. l\1oR.ALES. 
The proclamation o:f the United States, November 19, 
1914, in regard to the neutrality o:f the Canal Zone, con-
tained rules as to aircra:ft. 
RuLE 15. Aircraft of a belligerent power, public or private, are 
forbidden to descend or arise within the jurisdiction of the United 
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States at the Canal Zone, or to pass through the air spaces above 
the lands and waters within said jurisdiction. 
n ULE 16 .. For the purpose of these rules the Canal Zone includes 
the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent to the 
said cities. (38 U. S. Stat., pt. 2, p. 2039.) 
Swiss ordinance, 1914.-The geographical location of 
Sw·itzerland, surrounded by belligerents, made it essen-
tial that so far as possible the Swiss neutrality regula-
tions should be clear. A some,vhat detailed ordinance 
"~as issued on August 4, 1914, soon after the outbreak of 
the ,~Vorld 'Var. This ordinance provided for aviation 
in prescription 17. 
As to aVt:atton, atteution~ will be gi1:en to wha.t follottvs: 
(a.) Bal:oons and aircraft not belonging to the Swiss Army 
<·au uot ri~e and navigate in the aerial space situated above our 
territory unless the persons ascending in the apparatus are fur-
ni::-:hed with a special authorizatimi, delivered in the territory 
oc-cupied by the anny, by the conunander of the army; in the 
rest of the country, by the federal military department. 
( lJ) The passage of all balloons and aircraft cOining from 
abroad into our aerial space is forbidden. It will be opposed 
if necessary by all available means, and these aircraft will be 
coutrolled whenever that appears advantageous. 
(c) In case of the landing of foreign balloons or aircraft, their 
passengers will be conducted to the nearest superior military 
cmnmander, who will act according to his "instructions. The 
apparatus and the articles which it contains ought, in any case, 
to be seized by the military authorities or the police. The federal 
military department or the commander of the army will decide 
what ought to be done "'ith the personnel and materiel of a bal-
loon or aircraft coming into our territory through force majeure 
and when there appears to be no reprehensible intention or 
negligence. (1916 N. W. C., International Law Topics, p. 73.) 
In the notification to the French Government, August 
8, 1914, it was said : 
The Swiss Federal Government has notified the Government of 
the Republic under date of August 8, 1914, that in view of the 
Iuaintenance of the neutrality of Switzerland it is forbidden to 
all balloons and aircraft coming fron1 a foreign country to pass. 
in the aerial space above the Swiss territory. All means will 
be taken, if necessary, to prevent this passage. (Ibid. 77.) 
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Delivery of aircraft in neutral ports.-Article 18 of 
I 
'fhirteenth Hague Convention, 1.907, provides: 
Belligerent ships of war can not make use of neutral ports, 
roadsteads, or territorial waters for replenishing or increasing 
their supplies of war material or their armament or for com-
pleting their crews. (Hague and Geneva Conventions, 1911, p. 
124.) 
This article in effect embodies a part of article 5 of 
the treaty of "\V ashington, 1871, as applied to belligerents. 
At the present time aircraft may be and are often an 
essential part of the ar1nament of a vessel of war, and a 
neutral is justified or under obligation to assume that 
aircraft are a part of the armament. The delivery of the 
aircraft to the Hail in this situation is therefore in con-
travention of the principles of The Hague Convention. 
Cruiser of X in neutral ports.-The H mil, a cruiser of 
State X, has acted in a manner contrary to article 18 
of Thirteenth Hague Convention, 1907, and accordingly 
not in accord \vith the treaty of vVashington of 1871. 
The principle embodied in article 18 is Qne of the most 
widely accepted in preventing increase of armament in 
a neutral port. In the neutral port in the State of 
Panama the testing of an aircraft would likewise be con-
trary to the spirit of Thirteenth Hague Convention, 1907, 
"\vhich in article 1 enjoins respect for the rights of neutral 
States, among vvhich is that to d~termine the use of 
aerial space above its territory. 
The authorities of the port of the State of Pana1na 
are justified in protesting against the trial flight of the 
aircraft from the Hail and may take such action as may 
be necessary to prevent the flight or may intern the Hail. 
The commander of the cruiser of the United States, 
not being under the authority of Panama, should report 
the facts to the proper authorities of the United States 
and await instructions. 
Panama and the Pana(f)1(J) Oanal.-As under the terms 
of the treaty of 1903, the United States guarantees and 
.,vill maintain the independence of Panama, it is not 
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necessary :for Pana1na to support :forces :for this pur-
pose. rrhe United States and Panama took action in co-
operation during the \Vorld \Var :for the maintenance 
o:£ their rights. The agreement o:f October 10, 1914, 1nade 
provision for reciprocal hospitality to belligerent vessels 
of 'var. The II ail had violated the neutrality o:£ Panama, 
and entering the Panama Canal Zone comes within an area 
in 'vhich the flight 'o:£ belljgerent aircraft had in 1914 been 
speeifically prohibited. Under the relations existing be-
t,veen the United States and Panama, and in vie'v o:£ the 
previous acts o:f the II ail, Panan1a might properly look 
to the United States :for some action in support o:£ its 
protest agajnst a violation o:£ its neutrality. Accordingly 
it 'vould seem that the least that the authorities o:£ the 
Panama Canal Zone could do "·ould be to detain the 
II ail pending instructions :from the proper authorities, 
to 'vhom the circumstances in detail should be reported. 
SOLUTION 
(c) The authorities of the Panama Canal Zone should 
detain the Hail, not allo,ving the vessel to enter the 
canal 'vithout instructions :from the proper authorities to 
'v hom the circumstances in detail should be reported. 
